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Taking Back the Trash: Comparing
European
Extended
Producer
Responsibility
and
Take-Back
Liability to U.S. Environmental Policy
and Attitudes
ABSTRACT

The European Union and many individual European
countries have in recent years developed waste management
schemes that require manufacturersto take back products at the
end of their useful life and shoulder responsibility for their
recycling or disposal. The United States currently has no such
national scheme. As the generation of waste increases, the
United States will likely be forced to examine the merits of such
a national policy. The traditionalapproach to environmental
liability and the individualistic culture of the United States,
however, present unique obstacles to take-back mandates. The
Author addresses those obstacles and possible solutions to them.
The feasibility of developing such a system in the United States
is also examined.
The Author argues that such an
environmental liability scheme could be developed in the United
States, although there are many lessons to be learned from the
systems used by members of the European Union.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the United States alone produced more than 7.8 billion
tons of trash.1 Increased waste generation is not unique to the
United States; it is a global problem that will not go away. 2 Recycling
is a popular solution, but there is room for growth in the development
of waste management techniques.3 The speed at which technological
development makes products obsolete is a growing problem. 4 An
estimated 60 million new computers enter the U.S. market every
year. 5 New product development creates an even faster growing pile
of electronic waste as old products are discarded. It is estimated that
by 2007, 500 million computers will be obsolete and in need of a place
for disposal. 6 As the problem of waste generation continues to grow,
governments struggle to create new coping strategies.

1.

See EPA OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RESOURCE

CONSERVATION CHALLENGE: A YEAR OF PROGRESS, ANNUAL REPORT 2002-2003 1 (2004),
at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/osw/conserve/resources/rcc-rpt l.pdf [hereinafter A
YEAR OF PROGRESS].
2.
See Susan McInerney, Computer Firms Improve E-Waste Scores, but U.S.
Still Lags Behind Japan,EU Efforts, 26 INT'L ENV'T REP. 108, 109, Jan. 15, 2003.
See Jim Glenn, The State of Garbage in America, BIOCYCLE, Apr. 1999, at
3.
60 [hereinafter State of Garbage1999].
4.

A YEAR OF PROGRESS, supra note 1, at 1.

5.
McInerney, supra note 2.
6.
Catherine A. Kin, et. al, Globalization, Extended Producer Responsibility
and the Problem of Discarded Computers in China: An Exploratory Proposal for
Environmental Protection.14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 525. 530 (2002).
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The European Union and individual European countries have
implemented extended producer responsibility legal mandates to
address rapid waste generation. 7 Extended producer responsibility,
also known as "take-back," requires manufacturers and sellers of
products to take back from the consumer used products at the end of
their useful life and to pay for their recycling and disposal. 8 The first
country to adopt such a strategy was Germany. 9 Germany's policy in
turn inspired the European Union to issue directives for packaging
materials, waste, end-of-life automobiles, and other environmental
problems. 10 The popular European approach is to create private
entities to contract with manufacturers for disposal. 1 This approach
is one, however, that does not come without obstacles, including high
costs.

12

This Note explores the mandates adopted by the European
Union and individual European states and examines the feasibility of
their implementation in the United States. Part II outlines the
current extended producer responsibility schemes in Europe and the
Part III
current waste disposal system in the United States.
examines the societal and cultural differences that account for
varying environmental attitudes in Europe and the United States,
with a focus on Germany. Part IV discusses the feasibility of
developing national take-back requirements in the United States by
examining legislative obstacles and other barriers. Part V offers a
conclusion and recommendation for the United States that builds on
the strengths of the European regimes' schemes while recognizing the
weaknesses of those plans.

II.

WASTE

DISPOSAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL

CONTROL

A. Introduction to Take-Back Laws
In response to the growing problem of excessive waste, several
countries adopted liability schemes in which manufacturers must
take responsibility for their products, attempting to slow the filling of

7.
See James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L.
1243, 1274-75 (1997).
See, e.g., Robert M. Sussman & Greg S. Slater, Domestic Legislation with
8.
Cross-Border Implications: International Trends in Product Take-Back Requirements,
SB79 ALI-ABA 183, 183 (May 15, 1997).
Salzman, supra note 7, at 1271.
9.
10.
Id. at 1274.
Notice published under Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 - Case
11.
34.950 - Eco-Emballages, 2000 OJ (C 227) 43 [hereinafter Eco-Emballages]; Steven P.
Reynolds, The GermanRecycling Experiment and Its Lessons for United States Policy, 6
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 50 (1995).
See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 11, at 72.
12.
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landfills and the release of hazardous substances from discarded
products. 13 Such laws, known as "take-backs,". are requirements
imposed on manufacturers, importers, and sellers to take back their
products from end users at the end of the product's useful life. 14 One
catalyst to the emergence 15of take-backs is the growing support for
"producer responsibility."
This idea of extended producer
responsibility (EPR) focuses on creating producer responsibility after
the product is sold, when manufacturers traditionally cease to be
responsible for their products. 16 The greatest take-back activity has
been in Europe, where government-sponsored take-back initiatives
arose from concerns about scarce landfill space and potentially
hazardous substances in component parts. 17 The United States, in
contrast, imposes no take-back requirements at the federal level,
partly because the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
18
lacks the authority to promulgate them.
Take-backs challenge the traditional view that "a product's price
reflects the producer's costs of manufacture, distribution, and
marketing plus a profit margin."19 Normally, once the product is
sold, the manufacturer no longer has responsibility for its ultimate
disposal.20 Therefore, all costs of waste disposal are paid by the
consumer, typically through municipal taxes. 21 Manufacturers have
had little incentive to reduce the wastes associated with product
22
disposal because they have not paid these costs.
The main goal of EPR is to reduce pollution that results from a
The other goals of EPR take-back laws,
product's disposal. 23
however, have much more long-term significance. 24 James Salzman
asserts that the additional goals of EPR include (1) encouraging

See Sussman & Slater, supra note 8, at 187-88.
13.
14.
Id.; see also Salzman, supra note 7, at 1249 (describing Extended Producer
Responsibility as "expanding the responsibility of actors to reduce products'
environmental impacts throughout the lifecycle"); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social
Meaning of Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J.191 n.124 (2001) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh, Social Meaning] (defining take-back requirements as requiring the
manufacturer or importer of a consumer good to take the good back from the consumer
at the end of its useful life).
Sussman & Slater, supra note 8, at 183.
15.
16.
See Salzman, supra note 7, at 1270.
Id. at 1274.
17.
18
Sussman & Slater, supra note 8, at 187; see also Linda Roeder, Hazardous
Waste: Roeder, Electronics Coalition Considers Plan to Charge Consumers for
Recycling, DAILY ENV'T REP., June 17, 2003, at A3 (discussing the need for approval of
a national take-back plan by Congress) [hereinafter Roeder, Electronics Coalition
Considers].
19.
Salzman, supra note 7, at 1270.
20.
Id.
21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
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companies to design products for reuse, recyclability, and materials
reduction; (2) correcting market signals to the consumer by
incorporating waste management costs into the product's price; and
(3) promoting innovation in recycling technology.2 5 Take-backs make
these goals a reality by creating incentives for companies to redesign
their products, incorporating safer materials and making products
26
easier to recycle and reuse.
EPR is an extension of the "polluter pays" principle, which
traditionally justifies charging producers for all the pollution caused
by production.2 7 Under take-back laws, when the manufacturer
places a product on the market, that manufacturer must also pay for
its eventual disposal. 28 Under this system, consumers still pay for
the waste management of the packaging, but the increased costs are
paid in the form of higher prices rather than in taxes.2 9 Under EPR,
producers in effect accept responsibility when they design products to
minimize their environmental impact, and they accept legal, physical,
and economic responsibility for the environmental effects of their
products. 30 "In terms of legal doctrine, take-back laws may be loosely
described as transforming the manufacturer's legal relationship with
its product by imposing a future property interest which vests upon
l
disposal."'
B. Take-Back Laws in Europe
1. European Union
The European Union (EU) recently adopted a directive on waste
electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE).3 2 The purpose of this
directive is to prevent the production of WEEE and also to encourage
reuse and recycling of such waste. 33 The directive requires Member
States to encourage design and production methods that take into
account the later dismantling and recovery of their products. 34 The
WEEE directive sets a goal that by 2005 a system will be in place to
allow final holders of a product to return waste free of charge, with

25.
See id.
26.
See Linda Roeder, Hazardous Waste: Advocacy Group Recommendations
Promote ManufacturerResponsibility, DAILY ENV'T REP., Mar. 16, 2004.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Electronic
33.
34.

See Salzman, supra note 7, at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270-71.
Id. at 1277.
Directive 2002/96/EC of 27 January 2003 on Waste Electrical and
Equipment (WEEE), 2003 O.J. (L 37) 46 [hereinafter Directive on WEEE].
Id. art. 1.
d. art. 4.
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distributors taking responsibility for disposal of the waste. 35 Member
States must also ensure that users of electrical equipment have
access to information about the requirement not to dispose of WEEE
36
and the collection systems available.
The EU also adopted a directive restricting the use of certain
hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment. 37 One
objective of this directive is to contribute to the environmentally
sound recovery and disposal of WEEE. 3 8 This directive ensures that
after July 1, 2006, new electrical and electronic equipment put on the
39
market will not contain hazardous materials.
The EU also created a liability regime for packaging. The
European Packaging Directive came into force in 1994, setting
boundary conditions and objectives that must be transposed into
national legislation. 40 Under the Packaging Directive, each Member
State must develop a system to take-back and recover or recycle used
packaging. 4 1 The packaging waste may be incinerated-facilitating
energy recovery-or recycled. 42 One goal for Member States is to
collect between fifty and sixty-five percent of packaging waste and
another goal is to recycle between twenty-five and forty-five percent
43
of the total packaging material.
The EU has also shown concern for disposal of end-of-life
vehicles. 44 The EU found that consumers discard between eight and
nine million vehicles yearly in the EU. 4 5 Furthermore, dismantling
operations often cause a significant environmental hazard, as
residues from shredding contain significant quantities of hazardous
substances. 4 6 The Directive on End of Life Vehicles establishes a

35.
Id. art. 5.
36.
Id. art. 10.
37.
Directive 2002/95/EC of 27 January 2003 on the Restriction of the Use of
Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment, 2003 O.J. (L
37) 19 [hereinafter Hazardous Substances Directive].
38.
Id. art. 1. Such materials include lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent
chromium, polybrominated biphenyls (PBB), or polybrominated diphenyl ethers
(PBDE). Id.
39.
Id. art. 4.
40.
Council Directive 94/62/EC of December 1999 on packaging and packaging
waste, 1994 O.J. (L 365) 37 [hereinafter European Packing Directive]; see also Amy
Halpert, Note, Germany's Solid Waste Disposal System: Shifting the Responsibility, 14
GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 154 (2001) (citing European Packaging Directive, at
http://www.gruener-punkt.de/en/).
41.
See European Packaging Directive, supra note 40, at 14.
42.
Halpert, supra note 40, at 154.
43.
Id.; Jonathan Schneeweiss, Putting Packaging Waste in Its Place: The Case
for Federal Legislation, 15 VA. ENVT'L L.J. 443, 456 (1995) (citing European Packaging
Directive).
44.
Proposal for a Council Directive on end of life vehicles, 1997 O.J. (C 337) 40
[hereinafter Directive on Vehicles].
45.
Id. at Explanatory Memorandum part 11.9.
46.
Id.
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certification program under which only treatment facilities with
permits can issue a certificate of destruction once a vehicle is
discarded and becomes waste. 4 7 Authorized treatment facilities must
carry out a number of operations related to correct de-pollution and
removal of parts in order both to prevent pollution and to promote the
48
reuse and recycling of end-of-life vehicles and their components.
Under this directive, the last owner of a vehicle can recover the cost
49
of transferring the vehicle to an authorized treatment facility.
Proponents of the EU approach describe it as harmonizing the
measures of individual nations to promote the goals of protecting the
environment and avoiding obstacles to trade within the EU. 50 For
instance, the Packaging Directive allows individual countries to
develop their own waste reduction plans by making choices between
reuse, recycling, and energy recovery. 5 1 The Directive includes
definitions for key terms to ensure baseline uniformity, but it allows
52
flexibility by expressing goals in ranges.
2. Individual States
Individual Member States of the EU have independently
developed take-back programs. In 1991, Germany created the first
EPR take-back program when it passed the Avoidance of Waste
Packaging Ordinance, known as the "Toepfer Decree. ' '53 The basic
purpose of the Toepfer Decree is to require those who introduce
54
packaging into the market to take it back after the product is sold.
The decree requires manufacturers to pay the recycling costs of
55
packaging that is not eliminated or reused.
In response to the Decree, a group of companies formed a new
entity, the Duales System Deutschland (DSD), 56 authorized to work
57
with local governments to collect recyclable packaging materials.
DSD contracts with companies to handle the recovery and the
delivery of materials to sorting plants. 58 DSD then pays recyclers to
take the materials. 59 Companies participating in the DSD program

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
Packaging
at 1271.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6
Id. art. 5.
Schneeweiss, supra note 43, at 454.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 455-56 (citing European Packaging Directive).
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 48 (citing Ordinance on the Avoidance of
Waste (Verpacksungsverordnung) (June 12, 1991)); Salzman, supra note 7,
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 48-49.
Schneeweiss, supra note 43, at 463.
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 50
European Packaging Directive, supra note 40.
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 50.
Id.
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must apply for permission to use the "green dot" symbol on their
packaging materials.6 0 DSD licenses the use of the green dot, which
is placed on a product to signal that its packaging is recyclable and
that DSD will handle the product's packaging waste.6 1 Retailers
must return packaging without a green dot directly to the
62
manufacturer.
The DSD approach focuses on modifying industry practices
rather than on creating extensive governmental regulations. 63 This
system in Germany has led to creative "green" packaging ideas, which
decrease the amount of packaging waste. 64 Thus, the German system
has achieved the long-term EPR goals of encouraging companies to
design with reuse and recycling in mind, as well as promoting
65
technological innovation of product design.
DSD and the German government implemented a plan for
collection. The most widespread collection system in Germany is a
curbside system in which consumers collect green dot packages in
bags or bins provided to households. 66 DSD collects various product
categories from the bins and bags and then passes on the materials to
recyclers. 6 7 DSD selected these product categories for collection
"based on evaluations of their environmental impacts, as well as their
'68
potential for reuse and recyclability.
The Toepfer Decree stimulated the enactment of the European
Packaging Directive. 69 The German approach to solid waste disposal
70
affected the thinking of both European and U.S. policymakers.
DSD founded PRO-Europe, "an organization uniting all recovery
organizations using the [g]reen [d]ot under the EU directive."'71 PROEurope grants national recovery and collection systems founded to
implement the Packaging Directive the right to use the dot.7 2 By
2001, ten EU Member States had implemented the green dot system:
Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy, Sweden,
73
Austria, Portugal, and Spain.
France has also developed comprehensive take-back legislation,
distinguishing itself as one of the European leaders in EPR

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 51; Schneeweiss, supra note 43, at 463.
Schneeweiss, supra note 43, at 463.
Halpert, supranote 40, at 144.
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 55.
See Salzman, supra note 7, at 1274.
Halpert, supra note 40, at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 153-54; see also European Packaging Directive, supra note 40.
Halpert, supra note 40, at 153.
See The Green Dot in Europe, at http://www.gruener-punkt.de/en (n.d.).
Id.
Halpert, supra note 40, at 154.
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implementation. In 1992, France passed Decree No 92-377 regarding
packaging waste. 74 A French firm, Eco-Emballages SA, organized a
system to collect and recover household packaging that is designed to
meet the requirements of the French Packaging Decree. 75 Article 4 of
the Decree stipulates that any producer, importer, or other entity
responsible for marketing a product contribute to or make provision
for the disposal of all of its packaging waste. 76 Eco-Emballages is a
private limited-liability company that serves as an interface between
industry and local authorities. 77 The company itself does not collect
used household packaging.78 Rather, collection is done by local
authorities, who contract with Eco-Emballages and in return receive
79
support for their collection and sorting of waste.
Similar to Germany, France uses the green dot system.8 0 Since
1996, more than ninety percent of the consumer products in France
utilize the green dot.81 The use of the green dot in France is the
result of a 1992 Eco-Emballages contract with the DSD.82 In France,
a producer's financial contribution is determined according to a price
scale that charges a flat-rate amount plus an additional contribution
based on the weight and material of the item.8 3 Industrial firms
show initiative in their willingness to take back and recycle the
packaging
collected;
arrangements
known
as
"sectoral
undertakings."8 4
The undertakings are for specific materials,
including steel, aluminum, paper, plastic, and glass.8 5 Firms that
take back the waste are categorized by the sectoral undertakings for
86
each material.
Taking a varied approach, France recently issued a used-tire
recycling decree that will force distributors, importers, and
manufacturers to take responsibility for collecting and eliminating
the estimated sixty million tires discarded there each year.8 7 Under
the decree, tire manufacturers, importers, and distributors are in
charge of the technical and financial organization of the collection

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Eco-Emballages, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id; see also The Green Dot in Europe, supra note 71.
See Eco-Emballages, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Eco-Emballages, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
France to Require Manufacturers, Distributors,Importers to Recycle Tires,

INT'L ENVTL. REP., Jan. 9, 2003, at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/ied.nsf/is/AOA6H2U6RA

[hereinafter France to Recycle Tires].
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and elimination of used tires.8 8 The decree stipulates that service
stations, car repair shops, and other distributors accept used tires
from individuals on a no-fee basis. 89 But recycling charges may be
Manufacturers and
assessed on the purchase of new tires. 90
importers are expected to establish licensed, government-certified,
industry-wide organizations that will gather the used tires and
91
coordinate recycling and elimination.
Other European Union Member States follow the lead of
Germany and France. Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland,
Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
92
have all implemented some form of take-back initiatives.
C. In Search of a National Take-Back Scheme: Waste Management in
the United States
No comprehensive federal or state producer responsibility laws
exist in the United States. 93 The head of the Natural Resources
Defense Council stated that "regulatory or economic barriers might
be preventing more companies from operating programs in which
they take back equipment. ''94 In the United States, the concept of
"product stewardship" is an alternative to producer responsibility. 95
Product stewardship proposes a system of responsibility shared by
customers, retailers, local governments, and manufacturers for
96
disposing of products at the end of their useful life.
Some programs resembling take-backs exist in the United
States, however. Nearly all states and the District of Columbia have
implemented some type of oil recycling program. 97 For example, a
Massachusetts statute requires every service station, marina, or

88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Lawrence J. Speer, France Publishes Licensing Rules for New Tire
Recycling Program, 27 INT'L ENVT REP. 9, Jan. 14, 2004. The principal organization
coordinating the implementation of French laws on tire recycling announced plans to
levy a two to three percent recycling charge on all new tires. Id.
France to Recycle Tires, supranote 87.
91.
92.
Sussman & Slater, supra note 8, at 193. For example, in the 1990s the
Swedish Parliament passed an "eco-cycle" law, requiring product manufacturers to
take responsibility for disposing of their products in an environmentally friendly
manner. David J. Hayes, Beyond Cradle to Grave, ENVTL. FORUM, Sept./Oct. 1993, 14
(1993) (last visited Jan. 2004).
at
Computer
TakeBack,
Recycling
Network,
93.
Grass
Roots
http://www.grrn.org/epr/index.html [hereinafter Computer TakeBack].
94.
Solid Waste, 27 ENV'T REP. 1204, 1205 (1996).
95.
Computer TakeBack, supra note 93.
96.
Id.
97.
James E. Donnelly, Numbers Never Lie, But What Do They Say? A
Comparative Look at Municipal Solid Waste Recycling in the United States and
Germany, 15 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 29, 39 (2002) (citing STATE RECYCLING LAWS
UPDATE YEAR-END EDITION 1998 (Raymond Communications, Inc. 1998), at 42).
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retail outlet that sells automobile lubricating oil to install and
maintain waste-oil retention facilities.9 8 Surveys show widespread
acceptance of this program,9 9 creating an example of a well-received
take-back program in the United States.
Although the United States lacks large-scale take-back
regulations, there are alternative methods for handling waste. For
instance, landfill bans are a common tool for encouraging recycling.1 00
States vary widely, however, on the degree and variety of landfill
bans imposed, ranging from no statewide bans (but allowing for local
bans) to bans on a wide variety of materials. 10 1 Although landfill
bans can be an effective way to ensure environmentally compatible
disposal, they fall short of guaranteeing actual recycling of
materials. 10 2 "[R]ather than aiming at reduction, the bans focus more
10 3
on making the consumer choose proper disposal.'
Recycling is a major strategy in the United States for waste
management. Major programs aimed at the recycling of packaging
materials include minimum content laws, labeling laws, and
04
collection programs, specifically bottle bills and curbside recycling.'
In addition, several states and the District of Columbia mandate that
newsprint contain a minimum amount of recycled paper and establish
purchase preferences based on the amount of its recycled content. 10 5
Also, green labeling in the United States is done on a voluntary basis,
but it is seen as a way to clarify the recycling process by reminding
10 6
consumers to recycle and to help establish preferences in shopping.
Federal Trade Commission guidelines have been established to deal
with requirements that must be met by a company before it claims a
07
product to be environmentally friendly.'
Curbside recycling is the most popular mechanism for recycling
in the United States. 0 8 Under such systems, residents place their
recyclable garbage into different containers on the curb for pickup.' 0 9
Curbside recycling is available to more than half of the citizens of the

98.
99.
100.

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21 § 52A (2001).
Donnelly, supra note 97, at 39.
Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1264 (2001).

101.

See Donnelly, supra note 97, at 39; see also State of Garbage 1999, supra

note 3, at 49, 52. For example, 37 states ban tires from landfills, 43 states ban car
batteries, and other states ban motor oil. Id. at 40.
102.
Donnelly, supranote 97, at 40-41.
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 41; see also Carlson, supra note 100, at 1266-68.
105.
Donnelly, supranote 97, at 41-42.
106.
Id. at 42.
107.
Id.
108.
Carlson, supra note 100, at 1265.
109.
Id.
Typical curbside programs collect newspaper, bottles, and cans.
Donnelly, supra note 97, at 44.
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United States and nearly every state has implemented such a
program.110

Another U.S. approach to recycling is through Deposit-Refund
Laws, commonly known as "bottle bills," which are used in some
states and are seen as being detrimental to curbside programs
because they result in removal of some materials from curbside bins,
thereby reducing the value of scrap material recovered through
curbside programs. 11 ' Under bottle bills, distributors and retailers
charge deposits on glass, plastic, and aluminum beverage
containers. 112 Retailers must take back empty containers, refund the
deposit, and pass the empty containers on to distributors. 11 3 Bottle
bills make it more expensive, by amounts varying from state to state,
to throw a bottle away than to recycle it. 11 4 Such recycling schemes
establish a mindset and framework for the disposing of waste in a
productive manner.
Some large U.S. companies voluntarily take back their own
products. 115 A collation of groups called the Computer TakeBack
Campaign recently issued report cards evaluating take-back
programs used by computer companies. 116 Following its practice in
European countries of taking back used computers from individual
consumers, Dell recently implemented a policy in the United States
whereby it will take back any printer for free when a customer
purchases a new Dell printer, and the company will soon implement
the same type of system for computers. 117 Hewlett-Packard actively
supports state take-back legislation, including recent proposals in
Maine and Minnesota." l8 Sony started a recycling program to take
back its electronic products in Minnesota by subsidizing the cost of
recycling electronics collected and allowing recyclers to earn a

110.
State of Garbage 1999, supra note 3, at 64. Curbside programs have grown
significantly in the last decade, from 1,042 in 1989 to 9,349 in 1999. Jim Glenn, State
of Garbage in America, BIOCYCLE, May 1998, at 48; State of Garbage 1999, supra note
3, at 63.
111.
Donnelly, supranote 97, at 44-45.
112.
Id. at 45
113.
Id.
114.
See Jeffrey B. Wagenbach, The Bottle Bill: Progress and Prospects, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 761-62 (1985); see also Carlson, supra note 100, at 1266-1267.
California developed a unique bottle bill system that requires manufacturers of
beverages to pay $0.02 per container, which goes directly into the state recycling fund.
Carlson, supra note 100, at 1267 n.143 (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 14501-14599
(2003)). Consumers may return containers to a state redemption center for a refund of
$0.025. Id. The state fund reimburses manufacturers for their expenses. Id.
115. Sussman & Slater, supra note 8, at 203.

116.

Carolyn Whetzel, Hewlett-Packard, Dell Get High Marks for Recycling,,

Take-Back Policies, DAILY ENV'T REP., May 20, 2004, at A6.
117. Id.; Computer TakeBack, supra note 93.
118.
Whetzel, supranote 116.
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profit. 119 Despite these positive efforts, the Computer TakeBack
recycling is
Campaign concluded that the current state of electronics
"unacceptable," ranging from only two to ten percent. 120
Some municipalities and states in the United States, however,
have attempted to implement EPR-type programs. For example, the
city of Santa Clarita, California, introduced a diaper-recycling
program. 121 Santa Clarita came close to creating a take-back
ordinance, but it missed the mark by using general tax revenues
instead of requiring the diaper companies to fund the effort. 122 In
2001, the Nebraska Legislature considered banning the dumping of
electronic equipment in state landfills and imposing a fee on the sale
12 3
of new televisions and computers to help fund recycling programs.
In 2002, California proposed a bill that would charge consumers a fee
on the sale of new computers and televisions, as well as require a
warning label on televisions disclosing the hazardous materials
contained inside. 124 Not long after, the Electronics Industry Alliance
(EIA) polled consumers for reaction to pending legislation and found
that most consumers would buy from out-of-state retailers to avoid
126
the fee. 1 25 Based on this reaction, legislators dropped the proposal.
Still, wide-scale changes in product take-back and recycling
could be on the way in the United States. Environmental groups
advocate action regarding electronic waste, because it is the nation's
fastest growing environmental problem, is known to be toxic, and
causes long-term contamination when disposed in landfills. 127 The
Northwest Product Stewardship Council, a member of the National
Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI), proposed a
national funding system for recycling electronic equipment in which
consumers would pay a recycling fee at the time of purchase. 128
David Stitzhal, a spokesperson for the council, recently commented
that the consumer fee would diminish over time as manufacturers
would begin to absorb some of the cost in a shift toward a "partial cost
internalization fee."' 129
But this financing system has sparked

119.
Sony to Spread Word to Shareholdersof Policy Regarding Old Equipment,
HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Dec. 4, 2000 [hereinafter Sony to Spread Word].
120.
Whetzel, supra note 116.
121.
Anne Morse, Letters, WASTE NEWS, Dec. 23, 2002, at 8.
122.
Id.
123.
Vince Tuss, State Considers Bill to Ban Dumping of Discarded Electronic
Items in Landfills, 32 ENV'T REP. 2322, 2322-23, Nov. 30, 2001.
124.
Linda Roeder, Payingto Junk TVs, Monitors; Legislation: Bills Would Have
California Collect Money at the Time of Sale to Cover Disposal, L.A. TIMES, June 26,
2002, at BI.
125.
Think Tanks Wrap-Up, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 10, 2002 [hereinafter
Think Tank].
126.
Id.
127.
Roeder, Electronics CoalitionConsiders, supranote 18.
128.

Id.

129.

Id.
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intense debate, and after three years of national negotiations, NEPSI
130
has yet to reach an agreement on how to finance such a system.
Despite these efforts, environmental groups doubt that any NEPSI
agreement will ever pass the current Congress; they claim that state
131
legislatures will move in to fill the void.

III. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ATTITUDES IN AN EPR FRAMEWORK
A. A Western Cultural Divide: Europe and the United States
The preference for extended producer responsibility outside the
United States reflects a belief that EPR is consistent with the concept
of the "polluter pays" principle. 132 Perhaps the absence of such a
regime in the United States reflects on citizens' reluctance to embrace
a polluter-pays principle in a traditional manufacturing context.
Under such a context, traditional manufacturers are characterized as
polluters simply for creating products and selling them to the public.
Whatever the cause, the United States continues to lag behind the
European Union in waste reduction, particularly electronic waste
1
reduction. 33
Comparison between the United States and Germany is a useful
134
way to evaluate differences in environmental laws and attitudes.

There are many similarities between Germany and the United States,
because both are modern, industrial consumer societies. 135 But the
two countries differ in many ways. 136 The United States is much
larger, with many large regions that lack extensive industry and have
low population densities. 137 The vast natural resources of the United
States result in the lower costs of materials such as paper, metals,

and plastics. 138 Furthermore, a national waste-collection plan makes
less sense in the United States because of the great distances
between population centers and the industrial facilities that process

waste. 139

130.
Linda Roeder, Hazardous Waste: Roeder, Industries Resolve to Continue
Seeking Plan to Fund Electronic Waste Recycling, DAILY ENVT REP., Feb. 17, 2004, at
A4.

131.

Roeder, Electronics Coalition Considers, supra note 18.

132.

Kin, supra note 6, at 536.

133.

See e.g. Mclnerney, supra note 2.

134.
See e.g. Reynolds, supra note 11 at 67. See generally Halpert, supra note 40
(discussing German environmental policy and using the German model to evaluate
U.S. policy).
135.
Reynolds, supranote 11, at 67.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.

139.

Id.
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German and U.S. recycling rates vary. For example, in 1995
Germany recycled sixty-nine percent of its packaging, while the
United States recycled only 40.1 percent in 1996.140 Germany and
the United States recover similar percentages of paper and steel, but
Germany also recycles much higher percentages of its glass and
plastics. 141 These differences lead to the question, what about these
two countries produce varying results?
One cause may simply be that "[t]he American people are a
younger culture, with a stronger sense of individual freedom and
Voluntary action might produce better
personal autonomy."'142
results in the United States than the inevitable "feet dragging" that
will occur under environmental laws. 143 Marco Verweij makes an
interesting comparison of U.S. and German environmental policies by
examining the regulatory differences between the Great Lakes and
the Rhine River. 144 Finding that industrial discharges into the Great
Lakes in the United States were more toxic than discharges into
German's Rhine River despite stricter legislation in the United
States, Verweij asserts that this difference is explained in part by the
voluntary measures taken by German companies. 145 By the mid1980s, factories along the Rhine had already reduced their discharges
to a greater degree than required by the more stringent 1991
standards yet to come; in other words, voluntary over-compliance
46
exceeded even the future expectations of the German government.'
In contrast, U.S. corporations along the Great Lakes consistently
resist water protection efforts and refuse to accept the standards
promulgated by the EPA. 14 7 Thus, these companies have not
voluntarily exceeded legally mandated standards in the Great Lakes
This example is illustrative of different attitudes and
area.
approaches toward environmental regulation in the United States
and Germany. The politics surrounding water standards have been
more contentious in the United States, as is indicated by the deeper
148
disagreements about the problems and the best solutions.
Verweij asserts that a variety of factors account for the
difference. Among the factors are moral differences and state-society

140.
Donnelly, supra note 97, at 48.
141.
Id. at 48-49.
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 67 (describing in general terms what the author
142.
believes to be a popularly held assumption about American culture).
143.
See Marco Verweij, Why Is the River Rhine Cleaner Than the Great Lakes
(Despite Looser Regulation)?, 34 LAW & SOCY REV. 1007, 1024-25 (2000).
See generally id. (addressing comprehensive studies of U.S. and German
144.
environmental regulations and their successes as applied to those bodies of water).
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
147.
Id. at 1025.
Id. (Verweij makes this assertion based on his own interviews, as seen in
148.
n.18.).
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arrangements (including executive and judiciary branches and
businesses). 14 9 Another factor is American exceptionalism, a national
ideology that emphasizes liberty and individualism. 150 In contrast,
European values place greater emphasis on hierarchy, authority, and
deference. 151
Another reason for the U.S.'s contentious
environmental policies is a common mistrust of government,
152
especially on the part of businesses.
In turning to the state-society arrangements, the involvement of
non-governmental actors in environmental policy-making creates
challenges. 153 In the Rhine valley, non-governmental actors have
fewer such opportunities. 15 4 For example, under the Clean Water
Act, private groups can sue the EPA or state agencies for failing to
enforce environmental regulations, and they can sue private
companies not obeying the law. 155 This policy is not conducive to
achieving a meeting of the minds. 156 Furthermore, the structural
differences between the U.S. federal government and the
parliamentary system used by used many European countries helps
account for the vast policy differences. 157
Under the U.S.'s
presidential system, legislators have less responsibility for
implementation of the laws they make, which gives them leeway to
make unrealistic laws. 158 Also, a presidential system gives interest
groups a chance to influence governmental policies, mostly by
lobbying members of relevant Congressional committees. 159
Furthermore, in a parliamentary system, ministries confer with each
other in a lengthy process of creating law, while in a presidential
system agencies develop policies in isolation from each other. 160
Thus, under a presidential system, environmental laws may be
subjected to more outside challenges, inspired by unrealistic goals,

149.
150.

See id. at 1027.
Id. at 1029.
(citing generally on exceptionalism

DANIEL J. ELAZAR,

COMMUNAL AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY IN Swiss FEDERALISM (Daniel J. Elazar, Special

Issue of Publius 23, 1993); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (Brace &
World 1955); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF
DISHARMONY (Belknap Press 1981) [hereinafter HUNTINGTON]; SEYMOUR MARTIN
LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES OF THE U.S. AND CANADA

(Transaction Publishers 1996); BYRON E. SHAFTER, Is AMERICA DIFFERENT? A NEW
LOOK AT AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (Byron E. Shafer ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press
1991);

AARON

University
151.
152.
153.

WILDASVSKY,

THE

RISE OF

Press 1991)).
Id. (quoting HUNTINGTON, at 56).
Id.
Id. at 1030-31.

154.

Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1032-33.
Id. at 1033.
Id.
Id. at 1034.
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influenced by special interest groups, and affected by agency
isolation-all
factors
that
impede
implementing
national
legislation.161
The corporate climates of Europe and the United States also
differ. In many European countries, corporatism has long been
popular. 162 Corporatism is a system of special interest representation
of units organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated
categories. 163 Under this system, organizations negotiate under the
watchful eye of the government, and associations try to find a
consensus that is acceptable to all parties. 164 This system creates an
165
easy means for industry-wide environmental policy debate.
European corporatism is not widely accepted in the United States,
which has instead adopted pluralism. 166 Under pluralism, individual
actors fend for themselves, leaving little motivation for voluntary
over-compliance with environmental regulations. 16 7 This "fend for
yourself' attitude could affect the way companies and individuals
make environmental decisions.
B. Social Differences: Implicationsfor Take-Back Laws
1. Criticisms of EPR
A number of managerial problems arise with the implementation
of extended producer responsibility policies.
Obstacles to such
implementation include (1) product design that enables cost-effective
disassembly as well as high-quality recovery; (2) the development of
secondary end markets to sell the recovered waste; (3) the set up of
collection systems; and (4) making information available for all
168
decision makers.
Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned from the EPR schemes
implemented in other countries.
Germany's success in creating
packaging alternatives and promoting innovative technology came
with significant financial costs. 16 9
Unrealistic goals nearly
bankrupted the program. 170 Thus, Germany learned the hard way

161. Id. at 1031-34.
162. Id. at 1035.
163. Id.
164.
Id..
165.
See id. at 1036.
166.
Id.
167. Id.
168. H.R. Krikke, et. al., Mixed Policies for Recovery and Disposal of MultipleType Consumer Products, 124 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 368, 368 (1998).
169. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 72.
170. Id.
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that failure to deal with certain economic realities threatens the
17
viability of take-back programs. '
Some critics believe EPR schemes that force producers to become
"expert garbage collectors" will make them inept at producing their
own products. 172 As a result, critics claim, product design could
suffer, as most changes might be made solely for environmental
reasons. 173 For example, manufacturers might switch from plastic
components to metal because metal is easier to recycle, whereas
plastics might provide other benefits to design and ease of packing
174
and consumer use.
Financing EPR schemes is yet another hurdle to successful
implementation.
One such issue is whether take-back schemes
should require point-of-sale fees or force companies to internalize the
costs. 175 Companies are split on the issue, but a national EPR
scheme would require uniformity in financing. 176
Even if
manufacturers do reach a much-needed consensus, a hurdle exists in
finding support from retailers for a financing system. 177 So far, U.S.
1 78
retailers have not discussed such a project in the United States.
2. American Environmental and Social Attitudes
a. Environmental Attitudes
"The American environmental movement encompasses a variety
of environmental organizations, ideologies, and approaches.' 17 9 The
logic behind American environmental regulation stems from the
fundamental paradox that "individuals acting rationally in pursuit of
their own interests will produce a desired collective outcome. '180 As
discussed below, a variety of common perceptions about the
environment and environmental regulations form many obstacles to
implementing EPR-type regulations in the United States.' 8 '

171.
172.
173.

See id.
See Think Tank, supra note 125.
Id.

174.
See id.
175.
Linda Roeder, Roeder, Industries Resolve to Continue Seeking Plan to Fund
Electronic Waste Recycling, DAILY ENV'T REP., Feb. 17, 2004, at A4 [hereinafter Roeder,

Industries].
176.
See id.
177.
See id.
178.
See id.
179.
Stacy J. Silveira, Comment, The American Environmental Movement:
Surviving Through Diversity, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 497, 498 (2001).
180.
David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of
Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 147 (1995).
181.
Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 14, at 198 (finding that
individuals do not see their roles in creating environmental problems).
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From a historical perspective, industrial polluters were the
source of the most significant environmental and related humanhealth problems.' 8 2 Large industrial polluters were perceived as
easier to regulate from an administrative standpoint, being fewer in
18 3
number and more homogeneous than second-generation sources.
In the early days of U.S. environmental regulation, "[tihe limited
scientific understanding of the relationship between any specific
emission source and the environmental conditions affected may have
made the prospect of designing and supporting controls" on individual
companies a daunting task. 8 4
Furthermore, fear of underrepresentation of unorganized interests, such as environmental
groups, led to accusations of a pro-industry bias in the environmental
policy process.' 8 5 Thus, industry regulation perhaps conveyed a
social meaning to the public that industrial polluters were the source
86
of environmental problems.
Currently, U.S. environmental laws impose a command-andcontrol approach to regulation that comprises three basic beliefs: (1)
that it is possible to contain environmental contamination; (2) that it
is possible to disperse contaminants to a point that they are no longer
a threat; and (3) that it is possible to regulate pollution "at the end of
the pipe.' 8 7 But statutes based on these beliefs inadequately ensure
protections of the environment because they only attempt to mitigate
pollution after it has been created.' 88 As pollution increases and
accumulates, it becomes less feasible to dilute and disperse it at the
end of the pipe.18 9
Furthermore, the classic "experimental" policy-making approach
used in the United States makes environmental problems difficult to
solve with legislation. 190 Verweij illustrates that U.S. citizens are
more individualistic and that the U.S. political system is less immune
than parliamentary systems to challenges to environmental
policies.' 9 ' A consequence is the possibility of irreversible harm if the
192
environmental policies adopted are ineffective.

182.
Id. at 206.
183.
Id. at 106-07.
184.
See id. at 207.
185.
Spence, supranote 180, at 153.
186.
See Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 14, at 208.
187.
Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental Policy: Moving Past
Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543, 551-52 (1999).
188.
Id. at 552.
189.
Id.
190.
Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 295, 333 (2003).
191.
See Verweij, supra note 143, at 1025-26.
192.
Doremus, supra note 190, at 333.
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Governmental
regulatory
activity,
however,
generates
information that promotes environmental protection.193 Although
"regulatory programs are criticized for their clumsiness and expense,
they do force private actors to take cognizance of the environmental
consequences of their plans ....-194 Such regulations force firms to
place environmental costs on their balance sheets. 195
Thus,
regulations themselves can create environmental considerations.
A more general obstacle is the universally recognized
uncertainty that surrounds environmental issues. 196
Common
197
characteristics of environmental problems create this obstacle.
One characteristic is the substantial geographic distances between
harms and the events that cause them. 198 Also, environmental
problems can take years to manifest or for their full scope to be
understood. 199 This means irreversible environmental damage may
occur before the costs of it are realized. 200 Environmental damage
also frequently results from multiple causes, and it can be difficult to
201
sort out the extent to which each causes the problem.
"[U]ncertainty increases the difficulty of addressing environmental
20 2
problems" because it makes them easier to ignore.
Adding further difficulty, value conflicts invariably arise when
environmental problems are addressed.2 03 Value conflicts in the
environmental context are fundamental and often zero-sum with no
win-win solution possible. 20 4 No one can increase the amount of air,
water, or land-which means using those resources for one purpose
precludes using them for another.2 0 5 At the least, this creates a
perception (if not a reality) that businesses cannot produce to their
full potential through utilization of the earth's resources while
maintaining a healthy environment and lasting natural resources.
Another characteristic feature of environmental problems is that
they require long-term solutions.20 6 Also, the need for both durable
and flexible solutions suggests institutional and philosophical
problems. 207 Institutionally, policy creates a maintainable path while

193.

Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some

Ethical Considerations,32 ENVTL. L. 755, 767.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Doremus, supra note 190, at 319.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Rose, supra note 193, at 746.
200.
Doremus, supra note 190, at 319-20.
201.
Id. at 320.
202.
Id.
203.
Id. at 321.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 322.
206.
Id. at 320.
207.
Id. at 329.
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providing flexibility to adjust to natural changes. 20 8 Philosophically,
policymakers must ask whether to bind future generations to the
path of environmental protection, without realizing what future
values will be. 20 9 Thus, those making decisions about environmental
resources today have no way of knowing their worth in the future,
which could cause either under or overestimation of their value.
A common obstacle to environmental protection is the "tragedy of
the commons." Environmental resources have an "unpropertied"
2 10
character, meaning they cannot generate individual wealth.
Environmental resources are "open access resources" because they
have no owners and are open to all comers. 211 Because no one person
owns environmental resources, they are subject to the fate of every
commons: "over-exploitation and under-investment," "depletion and
decimation." 2 12 Also, there is great investment in scientific and
technological information that increases the value of privately held
resources, and slower rates of investment into information about the
consequences of exploitation of public resources, resulting in many
information gaps and research lags regarding shared environmental
resources.2 13 In short, concerns about public resources (e.g., landfills)
do not produce in individuals the same willingness to invest as do
private resources because individuals do not see the same
opportunities to profit from public resources.
Furthermore, studies reveal that Americans are unaware of their
2 14
individual contributions to existing environmental problems.
During much of the 1990s, the National Environmental Education
and Training Foundation (NEETF), which conducted surveys of
public knowledge of environmental issues, found that the public
knows less than it believes.2 15 This phenomenon is part of a larger
problem of the disparity between the public's view of the relative
magnitude of environmental risks and the experts' view of those
risks. 216 The result of a misinformed public is the creation of many
environmental myths in which individuals do not see their role in
creating environmental problems. 217 Despite this result, public
awareness of the complexity of environmental problems is growing, as

208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Rose, supra note 193, at 759.
211.
Id.
212.
Id. at 760.
213.
Id. at 762.
214.
Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 14, at 197 (citing 1999 NEETF
Survey).
215.
Id. at 197-98 (interpreting NEETF results).
216.
Id. (citing Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995)).
217.
See id. at 198.
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is public support for environmental initiatives. 218 At the same time,
there is a distrust of "big government," which causes the public to
219
desire smaller, more manageable efforts on the local level.
b. Implications of Social Attitudes for Environmental Problems
In 1996, sixty-six percent of Americans believed that the goals of
economic growth, environmental protection, and health and
happiness of people were simultaneously achievable. 220 A challenge
posed by environmental problems is that they cannot be solved by
persons' individual choices. 221 For any one person rationally to take
action, there must be some assurance in environmental policies that
others will also do so. 2 2 2 For example, no matter how concerned any
given individual is about an environmental problem, such as global
warming, there is little one person acting alone can do to solve the
problem. If one person stopped driving and installed a solar heat and
electricity system in their home, emissions of carbon dioxide change
only negligibly. 223 That person would see his efforts as futile, and
224
If
would not be motivated to reduce emissions within his control.
individuals notice others behaving as if they do not value
environmental protection, those individuals may wrongly conclude
2 25
that environmental protection is not widely valued.
These findings, taken together with the fact that the U.S.
population is largely unaware of the impact of individual behavior on
the environment, produce little surprise that the public has reacted
negatively to attempts to change individual behavior. 226 U.S. federal
environmental enforcement uses deterrence to induce compliance
with environmental regulations. 22 7 Under the standard deterrence
model, the assumption is that an individual will seek to maximize
expected utility and thus will comply with environmental laws when
the costs of noncompliance exceed the benefits. 22 8
Under this

218.
Congressman Earl Blumenauer, EntrepreneurialEnvironmentalism:A New
Approach for the New Millenium, 30 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2000).
219.
Id.
220.
Poll: 66% Say Env't Can Be Balanced With Other Needs, GREENWIRE, Apr.
18, 1996.
221.
Doremus, supra note 190, at 324.
222.
Id. at 325.
Several terms, all based on this theory, describe this
phenomenon, including: "free-riding," collective action problem, tragedy of the
commons, and public goods. See Carlson, supra note 100, at 1243-45, n.33.
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
Id. at 326.
226.
Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 14, at 198.
227.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of
Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 64
(2003) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance].
228.
Id.
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standard approach, individuals are not motivated to comply absent
229
the threat of legal sanctions.
Rational decision-making by individuals favors investments in
scientific investigation where there is some potential for private
gain-i.e., when the end product of the investigation can be turned
into property.2 30 Thus, that same rational decision-making neglects
scientific investigation where the benefits may never become
property, but may instead be diffused to the public at large, where
payoffs may not come for years.2 3 ' Information on such scientific and
environmental subjects could have enormous social benefits, but
because they are so dispersed, these subjects are likely to remain at
most a matter of private concern to individual researchers. 23 2 This
further illustrates the "tragedy of the commons" problem.
Regarding individual responsibility of household waste,
consumer choice is determined by two considerations. 233
First,
consumers look to see what is available, which is determined by what
the industry puts into the market.2 3 4 Second, socio-demographic
factors and income play role in decisions because of their influence on
lifestyle, attitudes, and awareness. 23 5 The people most likely to
participate in recycling programs are those who are motivated to do
so, but different motives underlie the behavior of different
individuals.236 Recyclers have motives different from non-recyclers;
while neither is concerned about economic costs, non-recyclers are
more concerned about the inconvenience of recycling. 23 7 Motives to
recycle and conservation competencies are the most important
predictors of observed recycling behavior, while amount of effort
required is another important factor.2 3 8 These recycling behaviors
will likely have an impact on the effectiveness of any take-back
program, as consumers will have to participate by returning goods to
manufacturers, either through curbside collection or returning to a
collection location.
Ebreo and Vining found that community infrastructure does
influence people's attitudes toward recycling programs and policies
during their studies of the motives and attitudes regarding recycling

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
Producers

Id.
Rose, supra note 193, at 764.
Id.
Id.
Chris Coggins, Waste Prevention - An Issue of Shared Responsibilityfor UK
and Consumers: Policy Options and Measurement, 32 RESOURCES,
CONSERVATION & RECYCLING, 181, 183 (2001).
234.
Id.
235.
Id.
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237.
238.
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among residents of Champaign, Illinois. 239 In the early stages of solid
waste planning, residents placed more emphasis on matters of
personal convenience than on altruistic factors and adherence to
social norms. 240 If recycling is highly convenient, the strengths of
attitudes in favor of recycling and environmental protection are of
little importance in predicting behavior; those weakly motivated to
24 1
recycle are just as likely to recycle as those strongly motivated.
External and internal norms also play a role in motivating
environmental compliance. 24 2
Internal norms arise when an
individual adopts a behavior as an obligation. 243 The perceived costs
of violating an internal norm stem from the expected feelings of guilt
and shame upon violation. 244 External norms include popular beliefs
about social obligations; noncompliance may trigger social
sanctions. 245 Thus, the perceived costs of violating an external norm
246
are the sanctions expected when others learn of the norm violation.
The Schwartz norm activation theory suggests that the intensity of
the obligation felt by the individual affects a norm's influence on
behavior. 24 7 Awareness of the consequences to the welfare of others
stemming from an individual's actions and an attribution of personal
responsibility for causing or preventing those consequences both
activate norms. 248 Laws and law enforcement can tie internal norms
24 9
to concrete norms, thus leading to new behavioral intentions.
Therefore, enforcement of environmental laws could be achieved by
providing information about the consequences of noncompliance and
250
the individual's ability to prevent those consequences.
U.S. citizens now place increasing importance on protecting the
environment. 251
"The lobbying and legislative successes of the
American environmental movement have redefined the general
'252
public's attitudes toward environmental policy problems.
Fortunately, those attitudes have been redefined in moral or ethical

239.
Id. at 155, 168.
240
Id. at 155.
241.
Carlson, supra note 100, at 1282, n.203.
242.
See Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supranote 227, at 67.
243.
See id. at 67-68.
244.
Id.
245.
Id. at 69.
246.
Id. at 69-70.
247.
Id. at 73 (citing SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ, A NORMATIVE DECISION-MAKING
MODEL OF ALTRUISM, IN ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 189, 193-202 (Jacqueline
Macauley & Leonard Berkowitz eds., 1970)).
248.
Id.
249.
Id. at 75 (citing Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 408 (1997)).
250.
Id. at 74.
251.
See Spence, supra note 180, at 158.
252.
Id. at 159.
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terms.2 53
These new attitudes create hope for the success of
environmental protection regimes that require individual action, such
as take-back laws.
This concept also applies to businesses. Businesses do consider
environmental values in making decisions, at least in part because of
environmental laws. 254 Governmental policy promotes consideration
by businesses of environmental issues in two ways. 255 First, policy
environmental protection by establishing standards to which
businesses must comply. 256
Second, laws indirectly influence
2 57
businesses by stigmatizing their violations of environmental laws.
Thus, environmental policies promote environmental protections in
the decision making of businesses as well as for individuals.

IV.

TAKE-BACK: A SOLUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES?

A. Developing a Regulatory Scheme: Legislative Feasibility
The United States is unique among industrialized countries in
not having any national EPR mandates.2 58 At the present time, only
individual companies in the United States have implemented takeback policies.2 59 For example, Xerox earns substantial profits by
2 60
taking back and remanufacturing the office equipment it produces.
Also, the carpet industry was the first in the United States to develop
take-back programs. 261 While voluntary efforts continue to grow,
particularly in the electronics industry, national take-back legislation
is not foreseeable in the near future.2 6 2 The lack of legislation may
stem from pessimistic attitudes about federal environmental
regulation, as illustrated by Congressman Earl Blumenauer:
For most of the last decade, environmental protection at the federal
level has reached an impasse, as increasing concerns about the
economic and social impacts of environmental regulation have led to
the extension of important targets and deadlines as well as growing
resistance to new protective legislation. When the federal government
does act, initiatives providing long-term environmental protection are
often sidetracked by issues that are shorter-term, more tangible, and

253.
Id.
254.
See Id. at 166 (stating that legal standards facilitate collective action on the
part of businesses irrespective of penalties).
255.
Id. at 166.
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
258.
Bette K. Fishbein, Carpet Take-Back: EPR American Style, ENVTL. QUALITY
MGMT., Autumn 2000, at 25, 26.
259.
Id. at 26.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
Roeder, Industries,supra note 175.
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easier to accomplish. Comprehensive environmental approaches are
too often laid aside as overly complex or even impossible to
263
implement.

The National Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative met in
June 2003 to study options for a nationwide electronic wasterecycling program. 264 All sides involved, including environmentalists,
government officials, and industry leaders, voiced concerns about
such a program. 265 Environmentalists are particularly concerned
because they doubt that the process will produce a viable national
266
solution for handling electronic waste.
A troublesome obstacle "is funding. Local governments and
environmental groups want to charge consumers a front-end
environmental fee for each unit they purchase to pay for the collection
and recycling of scrap electronics." 267 But Hewlett-Packard's Director
of Global Policy, David Isaacs, believes that front-end fees are not fair
or sound. 268 Hewlett-Packard has announced its "HP Proposal,"
which would have manufacturers internally bear the costs of
recycling end-of-life equipment. 269 The HP Proposal, based on the
European Union's Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
Directive, called for manufacturer responsibility at least from the
2 70
point of consolidation, leaving the details up to Member States.
"With all three branches of the federal government-legislative,
executive, and judicial-deeply involved with environmental issues,
there are a number of ways to derail initiatives."27 1 Skeptics doubt
that any legislation amenable to NEPSI will pass the current
Congress. 272 According to Congressman Blumenauer, an increase of
conservative thinking in Congress created a blocking of regulations,
Furthermore, the U.S. high
environmental or otherwise. 273

263.
Blumenauer, supra note 218, at 4-5.
264.
Joe Truini, Scrambled Circuits; E-waste Recycling Initiative Staggers;
Pessimism Grows, WASTE NEWS, June 23, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Truini, Scrambled
Circuits).
265.
Id.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
Id.
268
269.
Id.
270.
Id.
271.
Blumenauer, supra note 218, at 5.
Truini, Scrambled Circuits,supra note 264.
272.
273.
Blumenauer, supra note 218, at 5. Environmental liability regimes can be
politically unpopular. For example, in 2002 a Maryland House of Delegates committee
rejected two environmental bills supported by the governor, which would have
increased fines for water pollution and restricted the dumping of solid waste. State
House Speaker Casper Taylor Jr. claimed the bills went too far, stating "I really think
there is a limit on how far the environmental community can go and still maintain a
good pro-business climate. There's got to be a balance, a certain reasonableness in our
approach."
See Maryland: State Delegates Kill 2 of Governor's Enviro Bills,
GREENWIRE, March 13, 2002.
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technology industry is eager to voice disapproval of such a plan, as
are other industries. 274 Although NEPSI negotiations and planning
continue, groups opposing any such legislation will be able to lobby
for Congressional disapproval of such legislation. Resistance to such
environmental regulations could spell big trouble for innovative EPR
regulations.
David Wood, program director of GrassRoots Recycling Network,
explained that "[a]t this juncture, there is far more likelihood of
success taking place at the state level than at the national level. It is
essential, therefore, that states forge ahead ....-275 However, there
could be problems with states developing their own proposals for
dealing with electronic waste. States that require reporting and takeback will have to notify all the manufacturers of the products to be
taken back;27 6 however, most computer parts are made in Asia, which
277
could make enforcing take-back laws nearly impossible.
Furthermore, states and industries may prefer a national solution to
recycling waste to a patchwork of varying state laws. 278 A study by
the General Accounting Office illustrated that in trying to introduce
new methods of enforcing environmental standards, state officials
face problems not only in a lack of resources, but also in regulatory
279
requirements and "cultural resistance" from federal counterparts.
One problem with mandatory take-back programs has been
identifying the responsible entity.280 The problem is that costs are
imposed on producers, so companies try to avoid being the responsible
entity. 28 1
Another concern is that it is not always practical for
companies to take back their own products. 28 2 However, some
progress has been made. As David Stitzhal, coordinator of NEPSI,
stated in February 2004, the electronics industry has at least
acknowledged its responsibility. 28 3 What the industry is willing to do
28 4
is unknown.
Another impediment in the United States to such laws is the
sheer size of the country. 28 5 In comparing recycling in Germany and

274.
See Rossella Brevetti, U.S. High Tech Industry Critical of EU Laws on
Hazardous Substances, Electric Waste, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, Oct. 24, 2003 (publishing
criticisms of similar legislation in Europe by industry leaders).
275.
Truini, Scrambled Circuits,supra note 264.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
See Roeder, Industries, supra note 175 (reporting on an effort to consider
financing for electronic waste recycling plan).
279.
Damon Franz, Enviro Policy: Feds' Attitudes, Regulations are Obstacles to;
State Innovation - GAO, GREENWIRE, Mar. 5, 2002.
280.
Fishbein, supra note 258, at 32 (take-back programs in carpet industry).
281.
Id.
282.
Id. at 33-34.
283.
Roeder, Industries,supra note 175.
284.
Id.
285.
Donnelly, supra note 97, at 49.
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the United States, Donnelly notes how much larger the United States
is and how driving long distances to collect materials becomes too
expensive. 28 6 Thus, in such a geographically dispersed country such
as the United States, it is more efficient for the materials to be simply
thrown away.2 87 A study of the German system reveals that a
reduction of transport and secondary packaging would be successful
in the United States, as it has helped to reduce landfill loads in
Germany. 28 8 Some argue that adopting an entire take-back system
would not work in the United States. 28 9 Nonetheless, the U.S.
systems for taking back waste oil and lead-acid batteries through
290
state implemented programs under national policies are promising.
Thus, a national plan for taking back items such as packing materials
and electronic waste will be successful on a national level if states
implement such programs.
Despite these concerns, there are three major reasons why takebacks would be an attractive option for the United States. First, EPR
programs shift environmental management expenses to the private
sector by placing responsibility on producers. 291 Take-back laws are
premised on the idea that waste management costs will be paid by
individual consumers in the form of higher prices or consumer fees (or
a combination thereof), instead of collectively with local tax
revenues. 29 2 In fact, EPR programs coincide with the "polluter pays"
principle, which according to classic economic theory can only operate
29 3
by incorporating environmental costs into industry activities.
Therefore, if the U.S. government imposes take-back requirements on
manufacturers industry and consumers will bear the costs directly.
Second, several states implemented programs involving
advanced disposal fees, a weak form of take-back laws.2 94 For
example, EPR is mandated for the producers of lead-acid batteries,
tires, and motor oil, and the disposal fees are reflected in the prices of
Finally, U.S. companies already voluntarily
those products. 295
practice EPR. 296 Such examples include the take-back schemes

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
plan).
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. (using glass bottles as an illustrative example).
See id (driving costs may exceed benefit to environment).
Id. at 51 (drawing lessons from industrial recycling in Germany).
Id. at 52.
Id.
Salzman, supra note 7, at 1289.
Id.; see also Roeder, Industries, supra note 175 (discussion of consumer fees
See Harsch, supra note 187, at 553 (discussion of "polluter pays" principle).
Salzman, supra note 7, at 1289-90.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
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implemented by Xerox, Sony, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, and various
2 97
companies in the carpet industry.
In anticipation of an alternative to such voluntary schemes, the
National Solid Wastes Management Association outlines four
298
components of good electronic waste and recycling programs.
First, governments would build upon existing solid waste and
recycling infrastructure for electronic waste collection and
processing.2 99 Second, advance recycling fees or take-back provisions
300
would provide financial support for electronic waste recycling.
Third, environmental, health, and safety standards for the proper
management of collected materials, including reporting and
30 1
documentation procedures for end-markets, must be ensured.
Fourth, government officials would support programs that develop
new processing technologies and new markets, especially those that
use recycled content in new electronic products. 30 2 Also, in the case of
take-back programs, those who rate and date electronic waste should
be supported to ensure accountability. 30 3 All four components offer
suggestions to current U.S. lawmakers.
A lesson is offered by the German program in establishing a
national take-back system.
Although German law mandates
individual responsibility and sets overall material collection and
recycling rates, it is the private collection organization that defines
"recyclable" packaging and sets tariffs for inclusion in the program. 30 4
The privatization of these duties is a key element to the success of
any take-back program.
If the United States were to adopt take-back programs, a
decision would have to be made whether to focus on existing products
or new products. 30 5 Selecting products to focus on is a critical policy
issue.
This issue is most critical for durable goods, including
automobiles, electronic equipment, and carpets (which are all
products that have been found to contribute to significant disposal
problems) .306
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Id.; see also Fishbein, supra note 258, at 25-26; Sony to Spread Word, supra
note 119; Whetzel, supra note 116.
298.
Alice P. Jacobsohn, Deleting E-Waste, WASTE AGE, June 1, 2003, at 6.
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Salzman, supra note 7, at 1281.
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Fishbein, supra note 258, at 34.
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B. Domestic Legal Roadblocks
There are two major legal barriers to enacting nationwide takeback programs in the United States. First, anti-trust law is a barrier
if a waste-collection monopoly is established, which is likely.30 7 The
packaging collection programs of European countries are all private
nationwide monopolies. 30 8 Predictions are that "[i]f federal EPR takeback laws were implemented in the U.S ....

it is likely a national

joint venture like DSD would be created by the affected industries in
order to manage the collection and end-use of the packaging or
products. '30 9 If such a monopoly is created, there would be four
options for avoiding anti-trust law.3 10 First, Congress could restrict
application of certain anti-trust requirements, although this is rare
311
and usually subjects the activity to substantial federal oversight.
Second, Congress could use a standard under a rule of reason rather
than per se for anti-trust action against certain ventures.3 12 Third,
legal precedent could shield the collection venture even if there were
no anti-trust exemption included in take-back legislation, if the
venture is the least drastic means to achieve the goals of the
program.3 13 Finally, Congress could opt not to provide any anti-trust
protection, which would encourage competitive collection operations
at a regional or national level. 314 Also, if the take-back program is
introduced at a state level, the state action doctrine could exempt
state collection industries from federal anti-trust enforcement if the
program articulated a policy to displace competition and was actively
supervised by state agents. 3 15 Thus, anti-trust laws do not present
an insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of take-back
legislation.
Another challenge to take-back proposals in the United States is
in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulation of
hazardous substances.3 16 The RCRA imposes a number of obstacles
to the collection and recycling of hazardous waste, including the
electronics that so badly need to be recycled. 3 17 Centers collecting
any hazardous substances are classified as Treatment, Storage, or
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See generally 40 C.F.R. § 264.1 (2004) (standards for owners and operators
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Disposal facilities (TSDs) under subtitle C, which would subject them
to EPA certification requirements, increasing costs, and provide
strong disincentives for collecting hazardous materials through a
network.3 18 In 2003, the EPA, recognizing this problem, proposed in
2003 to exclude certain hazardous materials targeted for recycling
from the definition of hazardous waste.319 Although environmental
groups remain skeptical of exclusion of too many materials from
RCRA, the EPA plans to continue to exclude such materials to ease
3 20
product recycling.
These legal issues leave open questions about what support the
American legal system will provide for EPR initiatives. It appears,
however, that Congress has the option of adjusting anti-trust law and
environmental regulations to accommodate such programs. Perhaps
such changes will create a more receptive legal community.
C. Attitudes as Barriers
The "law does much more than regulate behavior. It plays a key
role in knitting the very fabric of society, creating the background
against which people conduct their lives. '321 In subtle ways, the law
influences the values that communities espouse and follow.3 22 Laws
communicate messages to the public about their responsibilities help
to shape attitudes.
"[T]he public's short attention span and the media's propensity to
focus on controversy and quick fixes" discourage even handed
discussions and articulation of complete explanations to today's
problems.32 3 Today it seems that the easiest environmental issues to
terms. 3' 24
"stark black-and-white
in
those
are
address
Unfortunately, the problem of waste piling up in landfills is not one
that offers an easy solution. Thus, it is difficult to convey to the U.S.
public the complex advantages and disadvantages of EPR and takeback requirements.
Ebreo and Vining's study suggests hesitation on the part of both
recyclers and non-recyclers about curbside collection.3 2 5 Hesitation
may have been caused by concerns about cost, but it also may
represent a tendency of people to support programs that are familiar
to them, rather than programs about which they have little
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See id. §§ 264.1-264.101 (EPA requirements and procedures for TSD's).
319.
Linda Roeder, Agency to Continue Push for Recycling By Redefining Waste,
PromotingReuse, ENV'T REP., Jan. 23, 2004, at S-14.
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Doremus, supra note 190, at 296.
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Ebreo & Vining, supra note 236, at 166.
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knowledge or experience. 326 However, a previous study by Ebreo and
Vining revealed that higher levels of participation in recycling
3 27
followed the creation of curbside programs.
A possible solution to overcoming public negativity about
possible EPR mandates would be to educate the public on the benefits
of such programs. Still, research on the role of educational programs
in strengthening environmental values is ambiguous. 328 However,
information campaigns increase knowledge and signal the importance
of the desired behavior. 329 Empirical studies show that information
about existing campaigns can increase recycling behavior.330
Furthermore, educational programs are not the only means by
which the public's opinions about solid waste programs are
influenced. "Although it has not received a great deal of attention,
the provision and implementation of programs themselves can have
an effect on the public's attitudes and motives as well as their
behavior. '33 1 Studies have shown that improving accessibility to
recycling programs can result in higher levels of participation. 332
Through the use of laws, the public receives a message conveyed by a
law, and that message can affect perceptions about the sources of the
problem and on the social norms that develop in response to those
perceptions. 3 33 Perhaps actually implementing an EPR collection
system is the best way to garner public support for producer takebacks.
In further support of simply implementing a take-back program
to improve awareness are the many ways in which laws shape
behavior. 334
By their very existence, laws shape actions and
attitudes.a 35 First, laws shape technology by either encouraging or
discouraging the development of new technologies. 336
That
regulatory schemes produce incentives to innovate for purposes of
environmental compliance lends support to the hope that U.S.
manufacturers will alter products and create collection systems in
order to make recycling easier at the end of useful life. 337 Second,
laws shape institutions that determine the principles and values that
motivate public actions.3 3 8 Laws in themselves tell to the public what
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they should value; thus, take-back laws can generate support from
the public simply by existing and being enforced. 33 9 Laws can also
encourage
and discourage
the
development
of particular
capabilities. 340
Mandating EPR by law would ensure that
manufacturers would invent the capability to take back their
341
products.
A barrier exists in the fact that an EPR take-back scheme would
require action by individuals to return products to their
manufacturers. 34 2
The United States has a long history of
individuals failing to appreciate their own contributions to
environmental problems and of resistance to attempts to regulate
individual behavior. 343 Overcoming this mindset and empowering
individuals to participate will likely be the largest hurdle in
implementing a nationwide take-back system in the United States.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

"As policymakers search for answers to the . . . waste disposal
problem and seek to encourage recycling and other techniques, they
should keep in mind the primary lesson of the German experiment:
government policies cannot erase technical and economic realities,
they can only influence them or be broken by them. '344 "Those who
wish to see the journey of environmental policy succeed should resist
the forces that tend to squelch discussion of values. '345 It is essential
that EPR and take-backs be discussed in terms of the values they
reveal.3 46 In codifying EPR, the U.S. government will be adopting the
polluter pays principle.
The first task will be the development of realistic goals.3 4 7 The
German government imposed an impossible burden on the DSD in
setting recycling goals that were based on ideology rather than
technical facts and economic realities. 34 8 Germany found that high
goals for taking back and recycling materials like aluminum and steel

339.
Id.
340.
Id. at 305 (offering as an example the public school system, mandated by
law, which makes available what we regard as minimum training for individuals).
341.
See, e.g., id. at 304-05 (discussing the ways in which laws encourage
development of particular capabilities). Applying Doremus' theory, EPR laws would
encourage manufacturers to develop products to be in compliance with the law.
342.
See e.g. Halpert, supra note 40, at 146.
343.
See Vandenbergh, Social Meaning, supra note 14, at 197.
344.
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 72.
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Doremus, supra note 190, at 378.
346.
See id.
347.
This is a lesson learned from the German system's unrealistic goals. See
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 72.
348.
Id. at 63.
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were workable, but plastics were far too difficult and expensive to
recycle at high rates.3 4 9 The lesson for U.S. policymakers is to assess
the costs of taking-back and recycling individual materials. As
different industries likely will be responsible for different
combinations of materials, the United States should create different
collection and recycling goals and different timelines based on the
feasibility of recycling different materials. Furthermore, the EU
approach is a guide for the United States in developing legislation
that will harmonize the states' activities. The Packaging Directive's
combination of definitions (for uniformity) and ranges of targets (for
flexibility) could help individual U.S. states implement programs
while sustaining national goals, just as it did in the EU.350
In terms of waste prevention and reduction by industry in the
United States, there is a need to move toward (1) using less
hazardous raw materials, (2) product substitution and designing for
reuse, (3) using fewer composite materials in products, (4) using
recyclates, (5) focusing on durability and extended product life, and
(6) increasing the importance of eco-design.3 51 In terms of waste
reduction through consumer behavior, it is desirable to introduce (1)
products containing less hazardous materials, (2) products containing
recycled materials, (3) longer-life products, (4) repairable products,
and (5) a process for leasing or hiring products.3 52 Extended producer
responsibility would influence on both companies and consumers to
value these ideas. Consumers would likely focus on products that
either last longer or are repairable if take-back laws forced them to
finance the end-of-life recycling of products. For producers, taking
end-of-life responsibility for their products seems likely to induce
them to produce products that are less hazardous, more durable,
easier to recycle, longer lasting, and more environmentally friendly.
In developing take-back schemes, the U.S. government can
expect that interest groups will play a role and influence the specifics
of any such plan.3 53 Because of this aspect of the legislative process
and the isolation of agencies under the presidential system, take-back
schemes will take longer to develop in the United States than they
did in Europe. 354 However, this does not make take-backs unfeasible
for the United States. The U.S. government will likely support EPR
at least in part because it shifts environmental expenses to the
private sector.3 55 Such support will have to overcome any political
resistance to environmental laws.
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The weaker forms of EPR enacted by states, the limited national
plans for oil and batteries, and the voluntary programs undertaken
by U.S. companies all lay a foundation for a national take-back
program for various types of waste. If the United States were to
adopt a national take-back plan, lawmakers would be challenging a
basic principle of the current command and control approach to
environmental regulation-namely, that it is possible to regulate at
the "end of the pipe. '3 56 Given the rate at which waste is piling up,
changing that principle may be inevitable, and the U.S. government
may be better off in recognizing its un-workability sooner.
The "fend for yourself' attitude prevalent among U.S. industries
presents another obstacle to the implementation of EPR.357 However,
voluntary efforts from some companies are encouraging.
Also,
regulatory programs force firms to face environmental concerns in
development and manufacturing of products. 358
In addition,
environmental laws require firms to meet standards and create a
stigma for those who do not. 359 Thus, businesses have less choice in
complying with EPR mandates.
Individual compliance presents a greater challenge. Take-back
legislation would require individuals to participate in returning their
products to the manufacturers or retailers-or to participate in a
curbside collection system. Individuals fail to see their own roles in
creating problems; 360 therein lies the challenge of motivating all
individuals to comply and behave as if they value the environment. A
national set of legal obligations would ensure individual compliance
under the standard theory of deterrence used in U.S. environmental
laws. 36 1 Also, such an approach could be very beneficial in that laws
themselves create norms, which in turn motivate individuals to act
based on the wish to avoid either social sanctions or internal feelings
of guilt or shame. Provisions directed toward individuals will be
particularly helpful if they include information about the specific
consequences of non-compliance, as this will help to trigger norms
362
and feelings of obligation.
Financing is another heated issue. Basic economics suggest that
internalizing costs will be the only way to create an efficient
system. 3 63 In accordance, the German and French approaches rely on
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the producers of products to fund take-back efforts.36 4 But some
manufacturers favor a system of front-end fees for consumers, and
the debate on this point continues. 365 One of the traditional goals of
EPR is to force manufacturers to internalize the costs of take-backs
and reflect that internalization in the product's price. 366 This
approach seems to be a sound way to finance take-backs, but the
challenge will be to force industries to reach such a consensus.
Another factor to consider is the collection of waste itself. If the
United States models its EPR mandates after those in Europe, it will
likely develop a private system for waste collection, similar to DSD or
Eco-Emballages. There are differences between Eco-Emballages and
DSD to consider in formulating a U.S. plan. First, Eco-Emballages
does not itself collect waste, but DSD does. 367 Eco-Emballages merely
subsidizes local municipalities that collect waste. 368 The French EcoEmballages system makes more sense in a geographically vast
country such as the United States. Because size is an obstacle to
implementing a national collection program, 36 9 the Eco-Emballages
approach is more feasible because it would build on the existing U.S.
methods of collecting waste through local municipalities. This is
preferable to a DSD-type system, which would require the creation of
an entirely new national entity.
The green dot labeling system is another possibility for
promoting an EPR system in the United States. Green labels would
create awareness of a product's recyclability.37 0 Green dots are a
simple plan that has worked throughout Europe to trigger the first
step in the recycling process: consumers placing the product in the
recycling loop. 37 1 The goal would be to create a perception among
U.S. consumers that green dots create a responsibility on their part to
begin the take-back process.
The policy of the National Solid Waste Management Association
(NSWMA) lays out several helpful suggestions for take-backs that
could serve as a guide for any U.S. policies. 372 For example, building
on existing waste and recycling infrastructure would be especially
helpful for individuals resistant to take-back requirements. Using
that which is already in existence could make people feel as if takebacks were not as much of an extra burden. The findings of Ebreo
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and Vining that non-recyclers are most worried about inconvenience
373
If
lend further support to the use of existing infrastructure.
current recycling systems are seen as convenient and are already
used, adding other products to be taken back by manufacturers might
NSWMA also suggests reporting and
not have a great effect.
documenting procedures, as well as the development of new
processing technologies. Reporting and documenting would be an
easy legislative move to make, as such requirements already exist in
many U.S. laws, including RCRA. Also, take-back laws themselves
would encourage the development of new technologies by firms
3 74
looking to meet requirements in the most efficient way possible.
Looking further down the road, the United States will need to
consider whether to focus solely on take-back legislation or go a step
The EU Hazardous
further by promoting product redesign.
Substances Directive provides an example of an approach that looks
beyond keeping the waste out of landfills. 3 75 The directive's ban on
hazardous substances is an example of a possible follow-up approach
that could be the subject of federal take-back legislation.

VI. CONCLUSION

"We will never reach an environmental endpoint that allows us
to maintain a permanent set of policy choices. We must, therefore,
always be thinking about how well our current policy choices will
prepare us for those we will face in the future.''376 The problem of
waste will not go away. As many discarded products make their way
in to landfills at faster rates than ever before, the U.S. government
will face the choice of whether to impose a national mandatory
system of extended producer responsibility.
Given international trends, the United States may have no other
option than to implement national take-back legislation. Luckily for
the United States, the European models provide many lessons
learned on take-backs and extended producer responsibility. The
United States can use European models to develop a national EPR
mandate while keeping in mind the need for flexibility and long-term
thinking. The unique culture and legal structure of the United States
requires and adjustment to the European example to create a new
system that can comfortably require participation from government,
industry, and individuals.

373.
374.
375.
376.

Ebreo & Vining, supra note 236, at 154.
See Doremus, supra note 190, at 302.
See Hazardous Substances Directive, supra note 37.
See Doremus, supra note 190, at 297.
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The development of a national take-back scheme in the United
States is not only entirely feasible but also necessary. Waste will
continue to pile up at even more rapid rates as the population
increases and innovations in technology make more products
obsolete. The details of financing and creating a national collection
system will present obstacles, but the need for such a national system
is ever-present.
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